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The War of 1812 can be a puzzling historical event for scholars to study.  Its monikers 
have included both “the forgotten war” as well as the “Revolutionary War Part II.”  Donald 
Hickey argued that “the average American is only vaguely aware of who our enemy was in the 
War of 1812 or why we fought.”1  One of the most confusing aspects of the war continues to be 
what precisely caused the United States to ultimately declare war on Great Britain.  A consensus 
has yet to be unequivocally reached with some historians citing maritime conflicts as the cause, 
while others blamed emerging nationalism some blame nefarious intentions and manifest 
destiny, while others prefer an explanation that involves parts of every theory combined.  
Coincidentally, a pattern emerges when we examine the historiography of this topic.  At the start 
of the examination of the causes of the war by various scholars, many were quick to blame 
obvious maritime conflicts as the cause of the war.  Those next generation of historians that 
followed sought to paint a larger picture by examining evidence related to economics, 
expansionism, as well as ways the political landscape at the time could have paved the road to 
war.  This work will attempt to briefly analyze the research that currently exists on the causes of 
The War of 1812, as well as to explain the shift in the historiography concerning those causes.  
While the literature on the War of 1812 and its causes are vast, for the purposes of this thesis, I 
have chosen to focus on a limited stable of historians. 
Chapter 1, entitled “Early Interpretations: Maritime Grievances” examines the works of  
Alexander James Dallas, Henry Marie Brackenridge, Richard Hildreth, Gilbert Auchinleck, and 
Henry Adams.  This chapter also examines how President James Madison attempted to control 
the narrative of the war before the Treaty of Ghent had even been signed.  Chapter 2, entitled 
“Changing Interpretations” looks at the works of Theodore Roosevelt, Howard T. Lewis, Julius 
 
1 Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Short History (University of Illinois Press, 2012), 1. 
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Pratt, George Rodgers Taylor, Warren H. Goodman, and A.L. Burt. The Third Chapter, entitled: 
“The Sixties Renews interest” looks at the works of Bradford Perkins, Reginald Horsman, Roger 
Brown, Harry Coles, Clifford Egan, J.C.A. Stagg, and Donald Hickey. Chapter 4, entitled 
“Bicentennial Anniversary Renews Interest” examines some of the most recent studies on the 




Chapter 1: Early Interpretations: Maritime Grievances 
 The first text to emerge concerning the War of 1812 was written by the then current 
Secretary of Treasury, Alexander James Dallas.  Dallas’s text An Exposition of the Causes and 
Character of the War, was in fact mostly written in November and December of 1814 while 
diplomats were still discussing the terms of the Treaty of Ghent that eventually ended the war.2  
Dallas continued to make changes to his work into early 1815 while some pages had already 
begun the production process.  This was because the full text from the Treaty did not reach 
Washington until February 13, 1815.3  Dallas’ full text was then sent to former President Thomas 
Jefferson by the then current President James Madison on March 12, 1815, with a letter 
requesting his assistance concerning a decision about the book’s publication.4  Madison wrote 
that he had originally hoped that by commissioning an “expose of the causes and character of the 
war between the United Stated and Great Britain should remedy the mischief produced by the 
declaration of the Prince Regent and other misstatements which had poisoned the opinion of the 
world on the subject.”5  What Madison was referencing was a declaration given by the Prince 
regent in January 1813, in which he “described the United States as the aggressor in the War.”6 
Madison specifically noted a desperate need for the text because the “pacification in Europe” 
with the ending of the Napoleonic Wars had caused the “turning [of] attention” towards the 
 
2 Alexander James Dallas and Howard G. Callaway, An Exposition of the Causes and Character of the War 
(Edinburgh: Dunedin, 2011), ix. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 James Madison et al., The Papers of James Madison (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984), 334. 
6 Alexander James Dallas, p. 76. 
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United States.7  Madison explained to Jefferson that Congress determined a “correct and full 
view of the War, should be prepared and made public in the usual Demi official form.”8   
Despite every effort made by Dallas, the text had not been finished before terms were 
reached in Ghent and Madison had feared the “spirit and language” of the text may be seen as 
“unbecoming” and upset the newly found peace.9  His decided on only a few possible solutions.  
Either rewrite the text entirely, add a “prefatory notice” making the reader aware that the text had 
been written before the details of the treaty emerged, or as Madison pushed, to suppress the work 
entirely and burn the few hundred copies that had already been produced.  Madison explicitly 
noted in his letter to Jefferson that the text either needed to be returned to him or locked away 
where there would be “no danger of it escaping.”10 Ever the decisive mentor Jefferson returned 
the book, explaining that he had read it with “great pleasure…but with irresistible desire that it 
should be published.”11  The decision had been made with the work released to the public 
quickly, with a prefatory note, noting what Madison had explained in his letter to Jefferson. 
 As a Jeffersonian Republican who had been appointed as the U.S. District Attorney for 
eastern Pennsylvania in 1801 by then president Thomas Jefferson, and later appointed secretary 
of Treasury by President Madison in 1814 one may rightly question Alexander James Dallas 
ability to remain unbiased.  While keeping this in mind when examining Dallas’ text, it is 
obvious that Dallas’ Jeffersonian Republican ideals shaped what he believed to be the causes of 
war.  Dallas began his work giving a thorough history of the policy of impressment in the 




9 James Madison, p.333. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Dallas, p.ix. 
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a tie of allegiance to his sovereign, which no lapse of time, no change of place, no exigency of 
life, could possibly waken, or dissolve…the British Sovereign was entitled, at all periods, and on 
all occasions to the services of his subjects.”12  Dallas explained that in order to “discover and 
impress” British subjects who were attempting to escape from their duties, British naval leaders 
and their representatives believed they were “lawfully” permitted to forcibly enter and search 
American merchant ships.  Dallas argued that this practice became somewhat difficult as the 
British claimed the “tie of allegiance” between a sovereign and their subject “cannot be severed 
or relaxed.”13  Dallas, expressing common sentiment and the time, wrote that United States 
citizens were not obligated to “accommodate the British maritime policy” as they had acquired 
independence “by the glorious revolution of 1776.”14   
 While arguing for complete independence from all British maritime policy, Dallas also 
brought up the argument of naturalization.  If the allegiance between a sovereign and their 
subject could never be severed, than what about American citizens who had been naturalized? 
Dallas charged the British with violating the “contract of naturalization” as well as the 
“reciprocal obligations of allegiance” it created.  He concluded that as long as the naturalized 
citizen “continued within the territory and jurisdiction of his adoptive government, he cannot be 
pursued, or seized, or restrained, by his former sovereign.”15  Dallas asserted that the practice of 
naturalization had been a respected practice throughout Europe, however, at this time Great 
Britain was claiming “dominion over the seas” through “the coarse and licentious hand of [the] 
British press gangs” who had been charged with the task of stopping and searching ships in order 
 
12 Dallas, p.40. 
13 Alexander James Dallas, p. 41. 




to discover and impress British subjects.16  Dallas argued that the citizens of the United States, 
outraged at the continuance of impressment practices, “with one mind and one voice, called 
loudly upon their government, for redress and protection” while the United States sought to 
“soothe the exasperated spirit of the people.”17 
 Dallas continued his explanation of events that he believed led to the War of 1812, with a 
relatively short discussion on the Berlin Decree, The Embargo, The Non-Importation Act, The 
Milan Decree, and the Orders-In-Council.  He concluded that every action taken by the United 
States was to obtain “just” and “honorable” agreements from the former motherland,  with every 
action to “appeal to the justice and magnanimity of Great Britain was now…fruitless and 
forlorn” as she “contemptuously disregarded the neutrality of the American territory…usurp[ing] 
and exerciz[ing] on the water, a tyranny.”18  According to Dallas, the war was inevitable, and 
declared by Congress as they “could pause no longer…under a deep and afflicting sense of 
national wrongs.”19 
 Alexander James Dallas spent the remainder of his text decrying his outrage for the “lies” 
the Prince Regent had spread across the world concerning the causes of the declaration of the 
War of 1812, and what nation held the blame.  He dismissed the war as one for “conquest” by 
writing that the instigation of the natives had been conducted by the British, and the “military 
occupation of Upper Canada, was, therefore deemed indispensable to the safety of the frontier” 
due to the need to “restrain the violence of the enemy.”20  As for the Orders-In-Council being the 
cause of the war, with the Prince Regent announcing to the world their repeal days before the 
 
16 Ibid, p,43. 
17 Ibid, p. 62. 
18Alexander James Dallas, p.74. 
19 Ibid, p. 75. 
20 Ibid, p.77-78. 
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declaration of war should have appeased the United States government, Dallas asserted it would 
have only “been the subject of renewed negotiations” as impressment was announced a 
“principal cause” with the only way to obtain peace being the “express abandonment of the 
practice.”21  Dallas explained that while the United States “never lost sight of the object of all 
just wars, a just peace” they “had no choice but to invigorate war.”22 
 In the last twenty odd pages of his text Dallas sought to unquestionably explain to the rest 
of the world the context of the war that had been fought, what the author described as “solemn 
appeal to the rest of the civilized world.”23 Dallas continued to lobby against Britain’s wartime 
behavior as a way to demonize British character itself.  Dallas wrote about a “striking contrast” 
between United States war time policy and the “insidious” policy of war that the British held. He 
went on to describe in detail some of the atrocious “war crimes” committed by the British, 
including their burning of the villages of Lewiston, Manchester, Tuscarora, Buffalo, and Black 
Rock “lay[ing] waste the whole of the Niagara frontier, leveling every house and every hut” in 
attempts to again describe how the British had “upset the social order…violated the principles of 
social law” by forming an alliance with “savages” and “selecting these auxiliaries in its 
hostilities.”24 
 After examining the content of this text, it becomes glaringly clear why President 
Madison was reluctant to publish it, and instead seriously contemplated whether he could destroy 
every copy in existence before it reached the press.  The Anglophobia was apparent on every 
page with Alexander James Dallas clearly hoping to persuade the world that the United States 
was forced, both by her citizens cries for help as well as the “unrelenting” “aggressive” policies 
 
21 Ibid, p. 81. 
22 Ibid, p.84. 
23 Ibid, p.85. 
24 Alexander James Dallas, p. 89. 
8 
 
that had been adopted by the British government.  Mentioned often throughout the text, the 
words of the Prince Regent clearly had a large impact on the rest of the world’s perception of the 
narrative that surrounded the war.  Dallas and the United States Congress, along with President 
Madison had completed what they initially intended to with the publication of this exposition, as 
impressment being perceived as the main cause for the declaration of the War of 1812 would not 
be questioned until the end of the nineteenth century. 
 In Henry Marie Brackenridge’s History of the Late War, Between the United States and 
Great Britain, published in 1817, Brackenridge not only felt that the British policy of 
impressment was the main grievance and cause of the war but his accusations about the “ultimate 
aim” of the British was even more insidious.  Brackenridge was born in 1786, the son of a 
prominent Pennsylvanian Judge.   His family sent him off at an early age to Louisiana in order to 
fulfill family requirements and receive a “proper French” education.25  He later became a judge 
and returned to Louisiana in 1811 as a District Attorney General.  After the state of Louisiana 
was admitted to the union as the eighteenth state in 1812, Brackenridge played a large role in 
creating the state’s legal code.26  During the War of 1812, Brackenridge played a vital 
“intelligence” role by reporting any events of importance directly to his very close friend, 
President James Madison.27  His book on the war was published in 1817. 
Impressment, explained Brackenridge, was simply one way that the British were 
“attempting to exercise their power without right over her American brethren.”28  Brackenridge 
 
25 Guide to the Henry Marie Brackenridge and Family Papers (University of Pittsburgh Digital Collections), accessed 
May 2, 2021, https://digital.library.pitt.edu/islandora/object/pitt:US-PPiU-dar193703/viewer. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 H. M. Brackenridge, The History of the Late War Between the United States and Great Britain: Containing a Brief 
Recapitulation of the Events Which Led to the Declaration of War, Its Progress, and an Account of the Various 
Brilliant Land and Naval Victories, Including the Battle of New-Orleans (Wheeling W. Va.: A. & E. Picket, 1831), 13. 
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claimed that Great Britain feared the United States would become “formidable rivals” so they set 
out to “eat away” at the “cement of our union” in the hopes of “seeing us divided and engaged in 
civil broils.”29  Impressment was seen by Brackenridge as an “odious and almost obsolete” 
practice, and while the Orders-In-Council may have caused American merchants “a thousand 
vexations,” Brackenridge asserted that the “intolerable outrage” and “universal clamor for war” 
from the citizens was directly related to impressment.30  Brackenridge wrote that when 
questioned, the British argued that they were “contending for their existence” as the British had 
been desperate for men to fill their ships in order to fight back Napoleon’s armies.  However, 
Brackenridge argued that the United States, a new nation dependent on trade for their growth, 
was also fighting for their existence and they “were no more bound to consult [England’s] 
interest, than she considered herself bound to consult ours.”31 
 The incident that occurred between the American ship Chesapeake, and the British ship 
Leopard, in which the Leopard fired on the Chesapeake when refused the right to board and 
search for British deserters, was the “true” start of the War according to Brackenridge.  He 
claimed that “although hostilities were not declared, the feelings of America were from that day 
at war with England.”32   
 Brackenridge did also address trade restrictions and native hostilities in his text when he 
considered other causes of the War.  He claimed that the trade restrictions were simply the 
British attempting to again assert her “control” over the United States, angered that we could not 
be “kicked into her war” with the French.33  When the British claimed to be “fighting for their 
 
29 Ibid, p.14. 
30 Ibid, p.15. 
31 Ibid, p.16. 
32 Ibid, p.20. 
33 Ibid, p.27. 
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existence” Brackenridge argued that this was not at all the case.  Instead, Brackenridge 
concluded “If it had been true, why did she continue, at such a time, to insult and abuse us in 
every possible shape?”34  Instead, Brackenridge claimed it had all been a “stupendous scheme” 
and the Napoleonic Wars were not a fight for Great Britain’s existence, but “only a contest 
between two great nations for the mastery of the world.”35 
 When it came to the topic of native hostilities, Brackenridge again claimed it was all a 
part of a British plot to undermine the United States government.  He argued that British 
“instigation” could be the only possible reason the native population was upset with the 
Americans.  While acknowledging that they had been “encroach[ing] upon their hunting 
grounds” it had been a “necessary consequence” due to the “increase in our population.”36  
Because the United States had “endeavored to obtain them by fair purchase” and “had been the 
first to respect [native] territorial rights,” Brackenridge believed there was no possibility that the 
Native Americans could be angered by their treatment by the United States (an idea that will be 
revisited later in this essay) and therefore the British had to have been to blame.37 
 In his conclusion, Brackenridge asserts that the War of 1812 was somewhat of an 
inevitability, noting that the continuation of impressment practices had forced Congress into a 
corner.  He referenced a quote from Benjamin Franklin, in which Franklin had rejected the 
naming of the Revolutionary War as the “war of independence.”38 Instead, Franklin noted that he 
 
34 H. M. Brackenridge, p.27. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid, p.23. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, p.298. 
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believed they had only experienced a simple revolution, writing that the “war for independence 
is yet to come.”39  
 In The History of the United States of America: From the Discovery of the Continent to 
the Organization of Government Under the Federal Constitution, published in 1852, journalist 
and historian Richard Hildreth addressed what he believed to be the causes of the War of 1812.  
At one point holding positions at the both the Boston Atlas and the Tribune papers, Hildreth was 
best known for his abolitionist writings, and even then his work was for the most part ignored 
during his lifetime.40  His History of the United States was almost completely overlooked and 
would not be referenced by most historical scholars till the next century.41  The problem with 
Hildreth’s work was twofold.  First, it was considered extremely biased with many referring to 
him as “the federalist historian.”42  Second, Hildreth’s work was considered “frigid” and “dry” 
with many concluding that Hildreth had “sacrificed readability to a theory of history.”43  What 
made Hildreth’s work notable, however, was the vastly different viewpoint he held as to what 
had caused the War of 1812.  Rather than accepting impressment as the main cause as other 
American historians had at the time, Hildreth sought to lay the blame squarely on then President 
Thomas Jefferson. 
 Hildreth instead blamed an ingrained “feeling [in the United States] of indignant hostility 
to England, the still glowing embers of ancient hate having been kindled into flame.”44  Hildreth 
continued, arguing that Washington and Adams knew that peace came at a cost, causing them to 
 
39 Ibid. 
40 Arthur M. Schlesinger, “The Problem of Richard Hildreth,” The New England Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1940): pp. 223-
245, https://doi.org/10.2307/360753, 223. 
41 Ibid, p.232. 
42 Ibid, p. 233. 
43 Ibid, p. 232. 
44 Richard Hildreth, The History of the United States of America: From the Discovery of the Continent to the 
Organization of Government Under the Federal Constitution (New York: Harper & Bros., 1849), 315. 
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make concessions at times which Hildreth wrote was how Jay’s Treaty came about, as well as 
the ratification of the convention with Napoleon.45  However when it came to Jefferson, Hildreth 
argued that his hate for Great Britain was so “deeply rooted” agreements with the nation felt far 
too “utterly abhorrent” for him to even consider, which is what he argued led to his opposition of 
the ratification of Jay’s Treaty.46  According to Hildreth, it was also this sentiment that led to 
Jefferson’s refusal to consider any of Greenville’s offers on changing (but not eliminating) 
impressment on behalf of Great Britain as well as his complete rejection of Monroe’s treaty 
without consulting with any members of Congress.47  Hildreth did make sure to clearly explain 
that he did not believe Jefferson intentionally acted in any way that he believed would have 
caused a war, as this would have been contrary to many of his beliefs, however he believes it was 
inadvertently caused by what he criticized as Jefferson’s great “inflexibility” as a President.  
While Hildreth’s work was all but ignored at the time it was published, it did show a completely 
different viewpoint from other American historians at the time.  Later American historians in the 
early nineteenth century as well as historians from Canada and England attempted to expand on 
the ideas presented by Hildreth. 
Gilbert Auchinleck, a Canadian historian, began his 1855 work A History of the War 
Between Great Britain and the United States of America During the Years 1812, 1813, and 1814 
with an attempt to reassure his reader that he intended to study of the War of 1812 with a fair and 
balanced approach.  To show his readers his dedication to truthful writing, Auchinleck wrote 




47 Ibid, p. 316. 
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is an imposture…we write, jealously observant of truth.”48  Examining this text, it quickly 
becomes clear why Auchinleck prefaced his work with this statement as his interpretations of the 
causes of the War of 1812 were completely contrary to what other historians were writing at this 
time.  According to Auchinleck, the war was ultimately provoked by the French Emperor 
Napoleon with his declaration of the Berlin Decree on the 21st of November in 1806.  
Auchinleck criticized American politicians and historians for writing the Berlin Decree off, 
believing it to be a “dead letter.”49  He instead argued that while “the extinction of British trade 
was greatly beyond [Napoleon’s] power” his decree still caused a vast amount of “extremely 
severe losses.”50  To support this argument, Auchinleck referenced a payment that English 
merchants in the Hans Towns received in the amount eight hundred thousand pounds from the 
English government in order to prevent them from becoming completely insolvent, proof of the 
severe damages caused by the Berlin Decree.51 
 Gilbert Auchinleck used this argument to support the British decision to issue the British 
Orders in Council on January 7, 1807.  He continued, arguing that while many had criticized the 
British for this move, they had been incorrect for assuming the Order was the result of a “bias 
Tory Ministry,” as the Order was the result of a “Whig Cabinet headed by Mr. Fox” a man 
Auchinleck concludes could “hardly be charged with any bias.”52  In his final argument it is clear 
that Auchinleck hoped to absolve the British of any blame for the cause of the war, in particular 
to divert the blame from the British Orders in Council.  For this, Auchinleck turned to James 
Monroe who at the time had been serving as the United States minister to Britain.  He wrote that 
 
48 Gilbert Auchinleck, A History of the War Between Great Britain and the United States of America During the 
Years 1812, 1813, and 1814 (Toronto: W.G. Chewett, 1862), 3. 
49 Ibid, p.5. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Gilbert Auchinleck, p.6. 
14 
 
Monroe had expressed “concurrence and satisfaction” with the Orders, confidant that “the spirit 
of the Orders was to deprive the French and all nations subject to their control, which had 
embraced the Continental system” concluding that it was essentially a “mild and lenient measure 
of retaliation” when compared to the much more “violent and extensive character of the Berlin 
Decree.”53  Instead Gilbert Auchinleck charged the United States in his text with the crime of 
empowering Bonaparte with their “ deplorable silent acquiesce” of the Berlin Decree, a move 
that the author boldly argued could have stunted Napoleon’s destruction.54  Instead Auchinleck 
blamed the “President of the United States” conspicuously omitting Jefferson’s name, for being 
“gentle, plaintive, and supplicatory [towards Napoleon Bonaparte], compared with the strong and 
angry language frequently addressed from [the President] to ministers and plenipotentiaries of 
Great Britain.”55 
 When it came to discussing the events of the Chesapeake affair that occurred on June 
23rd, 1807, Auchinleck again attempted to absolve the British from any wrongdoing.  Instead, the 
author asserted that the British ship Leopard attempted a simple enforcement of their legal “right 
to search” the frigate Chesapeake and had they simply been allowed to fulfill their right to search 
for deserters, the entire situation could have been avoided.  Auchinleck instead blamed 
Commodore Barron of the Chesapeake for the resulting entanglement that “contributed still 
further to agitate the public mind.”56  Again, deliberately omitting Jefferson’s name from the 
conversation, Auchinleck charged “the President of the United States” with purposely using 
“language calculated to inflame the public mind in a very high degree” making the situation 
 
53 Ibid. 





“vastly worse.”57  Auchinleck continued to drive home his point, explaining that “the President” 
acted hastily when he had ordered the immediate departure of all British ships from all of “the 
harbors or waters of the United States” a move he argued was a deliberately “hostile measure.”58  
Auchinleck instead commended the British government for their “frank and honorable spirit” 
who “before one word of complaint…promptly and spontaneously testify their concern at the 
mistaken proceedings of their offer, and their cordial desire to make reparation.”59 What 
Auchinleck referred to here was the immediate recall of British, of the Captain of the Leopard 
that had fired on the Chesapeake.60 
 To further show how American policies and actions resulted in the War of 1812, 
Auchinleck addressed the impressment problem, an issue he believed to be heavily 
mischaracterized by the Americans.  While he acknowledged that some Americans may have 
been wrongfully impressed he insists it was a problem that only occurred “now and then,” and 
was not done with “willful disregard of ascertained origin.”61  He again took aim in his text at 
“the President” whom he charged repeatedly with misrepresenting the situation, writing that 
mistaken impressment  never “occurred so frequently as to involve anything like the wrong and 
the suffering depicted in a proclamation” given by Jefferson.62  Auchinleck continued, writing 
that the American government could have “put a stop at once to the grievances” by taking steps 
to prevent British seaman from being hired by American merchant ships.  He painted a picture of 
a desperate Britain who “was striving to rally round her standard all the stout heart and stalwart 
 
57 Gilbert Auchinleck, p.7. 




62 Ibid, p.9. 
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arms she could bring together of her own sons in a struggle for existence” while American states 
“were employing…three foreign seamen to one native American.”63 
 Auchinleck concluded his interpretation of the causes of the War, and wrote that “the 
attitude” the American had adopted “must be remembered” and that their “interposition” during 
the enactment of the Berlin degree “might possibly have checked Bonaparte, and perhaps have 
recalled him within the limits of international law.”64  Writing that this was the “original cause of 
their subsequent misfortunes” and that it is “impossible to say how far they had themselves to 
blame for those misfortunes.”65  Auchinleck then wrote about Jefferson’s “retirement” from the 
presidency, writing that while he was a man of “great ability” he had done a disservice to both 
his country and Great Britain by being unable to cast aside his “strong anti-British prejudice” and 
instead “nourishing the war-spirit.”66  In Auchinleck’s text, Jefferson’s successor, Madison, 
simply “inherited” the “embarrassment” Jefferson had left him, and while he doesn’t believe 
Madison’s views differed greatly from Jefferson’s, he simply feels the fourth President was a 
passive figure, influenced by his predecessor and party, lacking any real opinions of his own.67 
America history was forever changed by the release of Henry Adams’ painstakingly 
researched History of the United States 1801-1817.  Adored by many and even called “one of the 
greatest histories ever written in English” this nine-volume text was described as “remarkable for 
its fullness of detail, its penetrating insight, and above all its strong, lively, and ironic style.”  
Adams’ text not only dominated the historiography of the War of 1812 for nearly a century, but 
essentially every piece of American history during 1801-1817, leading historians to declare 
 
63 Ibid. 
64Gilbert Auchinleck, p.12. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid, p. 16. 
67 Ibid, p.22. 
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nearly a century after its publication that “Probably no other period of American history has been 
so long dominated by the work of a single historian.”68  As one may expect, this led to certain 
conflicts when attempting to divide fact from Henry Adam’s biased personal opinion of 
historical figures that he attempted to portray in his text.   
Understanding the man Henry Adams was, is essential to understanding Adams’ work.  
Despite its bias, the text was so well researched it quickly grew in popularity, causing it to 
influence many and leave a lasting effect on how modern Americans perceived many events that 
occurred during this time period.69  Biographer David S. Brown explained in his 2020 biography 
of Henry Adams,  that by understanding the person Adams was, a man he described as a 
“transitional figure who bridged the chasm between colonial and modern” we can understand 
much about the “movement in the late nineteenth century toward an imperial, industrial identity, 
one both increasingly beholden to technology and concerned with the fate of the white race.”70  
Brown was also sure to emphasize often to his readers that Adams was a “significant, yet flawed 
American thinker.”71   
According to Brown, Henry Adams did not initially set out to follow the path of a 
scholar, instead he had hoped to follow the path set for him by  previous Adams men, into a 
lifelong career in public service.  Adams benefited greatly from his family’s political dynasty, 
believing he possessed an almost aristocratic type right to his own political greatness. However, 
Adams unpopular stance on the rights of former slaves along with his openly antisemitic views, 
caused an impassable fracture between him and the Republican party.  Brown asserted that 
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Adams had been “curiously incapable of recognizing the humanity of the former slaves,” and in 
fact noted that Adams had written that it was “unconstitutional to award citizenship or civil 
rights to freedmen.”72 Brown concluded that Adams’ “inability to read congressional 
Reconstruction as a moral struggle rather than a political blunder testified to a deeper private 
indifference in regard to race.”73   
Adams’ reputation is still tarnished by his racist beliefs today, with a recent article in the 
New York Times, concluding that “dynastic burden shaped the personality and career of the 
brilliant, bitter and thoroughly unlikable man who brought the prominence of the Adams family, 
and expectations for the endurance of political legacies, to an ignominious end.”74  
Adams’ interpretation of the cause of the War of 1812 was unique in that he seemed “to 
have been the first to recognize that an interpretation of the causes of the War of 1812 almost 
exclusively on the basis of maritime matters was an oversimplification” which ultimately 
resulted in a “distortion” on the current interpretation of events.75  
Understanding Adams’ interpretation of Thomas Jefferson as a man was essential in 
understanding the conclusions he came to concerning the decisions that were made within the 
Jefferson presidency.  Adams described Jefferson as follows: “[his] nature was feminine; he was 
more refined than many women…he was sensitive, affectionate, and, in his own eyes, heroic. He 
yearned for love and praise as no other great American ever did. He hated the clergy chiefly 
because he knew that from them, he could expect neither love nor praise, perhaps not even 
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forbearance.”76  Adams’ disdain for Jefferson’s (what he believed) to be inappropriate 
“feminine” ways prove Adams’ was firm in his belief that Jefferson possessed severe character 
deficits which prevented him from being an effectual leader.  Adams also wrote that at least in 
the onetime presented, Jefferson’s character flaws prevented him from performing his 
presidential duties.  
To support this accusation, he referenced a letter from Jefferson to Monroe in which 
Jefferson expressed that “the six months’ session has worn me down to a state of almost total 
incapacity for business.”77  Further criticizing Jefferson, Adams’ explained “he had brought the 
country to a situation where war was impossible for want of weapons, and peace was only a 
name for passive war… for the first time in seven years American democracy, struck with 
sudden fear of failure, looked to him in doubt and trembled for its hopes.”78  Hoping to solidify 
his accusations against Jefferson, Adams quoted the former Speaker of the House, Nathanial 
Macon who wrote of Jefferson “every able diplomatist is not fit to be President,” after learning 
of  Jefferson’s second presidential win.  Adams criticized Jefferson’s supporters as well and 
argued that they gave Jefferson “warmth and undisputed regard” no matter what the matter at 
hand may be.79 
Adams’ work was also unique in that for the first time the impact that Jefferson’s 
embargo had on causing the war was thoroughly examined.    Before this time, historians and 
politicians who examined and wrote about the war often ignored just how large a part the 
embargo had played, mostly due to the fact that those originally writing the histories had been 
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somewhat influenced by personal relationships they shared with Jefferson, Madison, and even 
Monroe.  The initial response by American historians was a regurgitation of James Madison’s 
war message, and the initial response from British historians was to immediately defend the 
actions that had been taken by the British government.  Adams attempted to explain what exactly 
went wrong with Jefferson’s embargo plan.  Adams asserted that although Jefferson’s 
“intriguing” new policy of peaceable coercion, the withholding of America's neutral commerce 
as a means of enforcing justice on the warring powers of Europe had been Jefferson’s most 
“famous experiment in statescraft” with Adams noting that “he was a theorist prepared to risk the 
fate of mankind on the chance of reasoning, far from certain of its details”80 
Adams did not seem to find fault with Jefferson’s embargo, in theory.  In fact, he likened 
it to the Berlin and Milan Decrees of France, as well as compared it to England’s Orders in 
Council.  Where Henry Adams did find fault was in the “ending” of the embargo.  Adams then 
concluded that a resolution from his grandfather, Senator Adams, that sought to “appoint a 
committee to consider and repot when the embargo could be taken off and vessels permitted to 
arm” had been “silently rejected” by congress.81  However, Adams was sure to detail in his text 
how Jefferson’s government completely failed at enforcing the embargo with its own citizens, 
with Adams specifically detailing the extent of illegal trade on Lake Champlain.   In the hopes of 
increasing adherence to the embargo’s restrictions, the administration did eventually resort to 
using military power against its citizens.82 
While Adams made sure to thoroughly detail each and every fault he found with Thomas 
Jefferson as both a leader and a man, Henry Adams did still manage to acknowledge several 
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aspects of Jefferson’s vision for the young nation that he admired.  Adams wrote that “Jefferson 
aspired beyond the ambition of a nationality and embraced in his view the whole future of man. 
That the United States should become a nation like France, England, or Russia, should conquer 
the world like Rome, or develop a typical race like the Chinese, was no part of his scheme.”83  
Adams continued, noting that Jefferson “wished to create a new era”  envisioning “a time when 
the world's ruling interest should cease to be local and should become universal; when questions 
of boundaries and nationality should become insignificant, when armies and navies should be 
reduced to the work of police” and concluded that Jefferson had been “eager to put his vision 
into reality.”84  Adams briefly addressed issues that historians covered later in this essay focused 
on, such as expansionism and native relations, however they were quickly dismissed with the 
author concluding that “nothing warranted a belief that Jefferson, Madison, and Gallatin would 
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Chapter 2: Changing Interpretations 
The Twenty sixth President of the United States Theodore Roosevelt, at the time a young 
scholar, became perplexed at the currently available historical accounts of the War of 1812 and 
attempted to offer an “impartial account of the war.”86  Roosevelt described what he saw as the 
“almost hopeless task” of “reconciling the many and widely contradictory statements” that had 
been made concerning various aspects of the war.  Roosevelt specifically referenced the work of 
British author William James, and his Naval Occurrences of the War of 1812. Roosevelt argued 
that James’ work was both “an invaluable work, written with fulness and care” as well as “a 
piece of special pleading by a bitter and not over-scrupulous partisan.”87  While Roosevelt 
appreciated the depth of James’ research, he found some difficulties accepting some of the 
glaring impartialities that plagued James’ text.   
Newly graduated from Harvard, Roosevelt hoped to establish himself as a military 
historian by producing a text that examined “much of the material in our Navy Department that 
has never been touched at all.”88 Arguing that “In short, no full, accurate and unprejudiced 
history of the war has ever been written.”89  While Roosevelt’s interest was in detailing the naval 
battles that had occurred during the war, he also spent a significant amount of time addressing 
what he believed to be the cause of the war. 
Roosevelt concluded that the entirety of fault lay on England, with impressment being the 
main reason in his mind.  In an attempt to stay true to his original promise of providing an 
unbiased account of the events, Roosevelt sought to support his theory of maritime grievances 
causing the war by quoting prominent Englishmen who supported his theory, that England had 
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indeed violated sovereign nations trading rights.  Roosevelt first turned to British Admiral 
Cochrane’s “Autobiography of a Seaman” in which the admiral wrote “our treatment of 
America’s citizens was scarcely in accordance with the national privilege to which the young 
Republic had become entitled… and generally treating them as though they were engaged in 
contraband trade.”90 
Roosevelt added an interesting grievance onto his list, when he wrote that he believed the 
United States should have “undoubtably” declared war against France as well, noting that none 
of the British “acts were more offensive than Napoleon's Milan decree.”91  As Roosevelt 
interpreted the situation, he believed that maritime grievances had undoubtedly been the cause, 
but he also concluded that the United States had simply been used as a pawn between England 
and France, a weapon that could be used by one belligerent European nation to cause harm to the 
other.  However, Roosevelt concluded that rather than adopt a measure that had initially been 
proposed in Congress to declare war on both nations, we “chose a [single] foe, the one that had 
done, and could still do us the greatest injury.”92  Historian Nicole Eustace explained “Centennial 
anniversaries provide unique opportunities for commemorating the past while characterizing the 
present.”93  This adage proved to be true, as the centennial of the war drew the interest of new 
historians who hoped to make sense of what the causes of the war had been.   
In 1911 Howard T. Lewis was the first to look outside maritime disagreements as the 
main cause of the war and published his brief article “A Reanalysis of the Causes of the War of 
1812.”  Puzzled by the strong southern and western support for the war, Lewis argued that the 
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maritime causes did not directly affect southern and western citizens and concluded the 
“maritime theory” failed to explain why these two groups led the fight in Congress to declare 
war on England.94 Historian Warren H. Goodman wrote that Lewis “sought the reason for the 
bellicose attitude of that section.”95 Howard T. Lewis concluded that the war “was carried out 
when the West began to covet Canada’s agricultural land reserves.”96 Lewis’ article was 
criticized by his colleagues as it was brief and lacked detail, however Lewis’ conclusion that “the 
key to the situation was to be found in the imperative demand for more territory into which the 
western immigrant might go and still be within the jurisdiction of the United States” proved to 
make its mark within the historiography of the war. 
In 1925 Professor Julius Pratt from Rutgers University sought a new, fully developed 
perspective, influenced by the questions raised in Howard T. Lewis’ article.  Pratt saw a 
disconnect when he attempted to explain why certain regions of the United States supported the 
war while others opposed.  In what he described as a paradox Pratt explained “If the real 
grievances which caused the war were interferences of Great Britain with American commerce 
and the rights of American sailors, why was war to redress those grievances opposed by the 
maritime section of the nation and urged by the inland section, which [England] scarcely 
affected?”97 Pratt credited F.J. Turner’s 1893 essay “The Significance of the Frontier in 
American History” as the muse for his theory on the causes of the war.  Pratt argued that prior to 
Turner’s publication, historians has regarded the frontier “as little more than a picturesque phase 
in the national development” and after reading it they saw that the “West has come to be 
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recognized as the source of many aspects of American character and the determining factor in 
many American policies.”98   
 Inspired by Turner, Pratt set the following parameters for his study: “to examine the 
development in the Northwest of the demand for the conquest and annexation of Canada; to trace 
the rise in the South and Southwest of the plan to annex the Floridas and possibly Mexico; to 
discover the relations of these two proposals to each other and to the question of war with Great 
Britain; to determine the position of the executive branch of the United States government 
(especially of Madison and his Secretary of State, Monroe) towards the plans for expansion.” 99  
What Pratt concluded in his study was that the war had presented a unique opportunity for both 
the North and South to grow somewhat proportionally at the same time.  This would theoretically 
then prevent a political imbalance that could potentially threaten one political party and would 
therefore hopefully obviate any objections in Congress. In theory this would have solved the 
problems being faced by members from both sides of the political aisles, allowing them to 
answer the calls of their constituents to increase land without sacrificing any imbalances to their 
political opponents.100   
Pratt’s work also focused the spotlight on what he described as the “savage tribes” and 
the difficulties faced by Americans because of the benefits the native tribes received from their 
relations with the British.101  During debates in the House, Thomas Hartly of Pennsylvania 
attempted to convince his colleagues of the seriousness of the native “problem”, exclaiming “The 
American is convinced, that she [Britain] has supported the Indians in their war against us.  
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Ammunition and arms they certainly obtained from British agents or factors.”102  Pratt continued, 
arguing that at the time Americans were fearful of what he described as an “Indian Menace” 
emerging from out west.   
Two Native American brothers by the name of Tecumseh and The Prophet had recently 
become very successful in their endeavor to create an Indian Confederacy, or rather an 
agreement between several large tribes to ban together to save their lands, creating fear and panic 
amongst American settlers.  Pratt argued that the rise of the “Indian Menace” out west cased a 
“general conviction on the part of the whites that the plans of Tecumseh and the Prophet were 
really hostile to the United States.”103 Pratt continued, arguing that this growing problem along 
with the “strong suspicion that the British were lending sympathy and support to these Indian 
leaders who sought to make their resistance to land sales a dam in the progress of the great 
waters of the white advance ”would ultimately result in a war, whether Americans liked it or 
not.”104 
 While he had acknowledged that Indiana Governor William Henry Harrison, the 
“representative of American justice and benevolence towards the Indians” had a respectful 
friendship with General Sir Isaac Brock, the Major-General of Lower Canada, Pratt also noted 
that the British had simply fooled the Indiana Governor with a false friendship.  Pratt explained 
that while General Brock wrote to Harrison that he had “implicitly told [the native tribes] not to 
look for assistance from us” it had simply been a part of a particularly evil British policy, its 
purpose being to “allow time for the consolidation of [Tecumseh’s Confederacy] that the aid of 
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the Indians might be more effective when needed.”105  The Battle of Tippecanoe in November of 
1811, a Battle waged by Governor Harrison on Tecumseh’s Prophetstown home, was what 
brought the “West to an eagerness for war,” Pratt explained.106   
While Harrison was able to obliterate the village, and deliver a temporary blow to 
Tecumseh’s Confederacy, the soldiers’ blood that was shed there enraged Americans.  Future 
President and soon to be War of 1812 hero, Andrew Jackson angrily scolded Harrison, 
demanding that “the blood of our murdered countrymen must be revenged!  I do hope that 
Government will see that it is necessary to act efficiently and that this hostile band which must 
be excited to war by the secret agents of Great Britain must be destroyed.”107 
 While Pratt presented several interesting points in his text, it is important to emphasize 
that Pratt himself explained in his introduction that he wanted to approach the causes of the War 
of 1812 specifically through the lens of F.J. Turner’s work, placing a particular focus on 
westward expansion as the cause of the war.  Pratt also explained that his work made “no effort 
to give a full account of the causes of the War of 1812 but deals with one set of causes only.”108 
He continued noting “the exclusion from all but briefest mention of the maritime grievances 
against Great Britain is with no wish to belittle them.  Without them, it is safe to say, there would 
have been no war.”109  It is important to also note that Pratt’s work was the first to place 
expansionist ideals on the inhabitants of the Southern United States.   
 In 1931 George Rogers Taylor responded to Pratt’s article, offering another answer to the 
question of why westerns and southerners “led the charge” for a war against England in 1812.  In 
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his article “Agrarian Discontent In the Mississippi Valley Preceding the War of 1812” Taylor 
concluded that historians had not fully understood the issue at hand.  Taylor wrote “the attitude 
of the western settler can hardly be evaluated without an understanding of his economic position.  
He was, after all, typically an ambitious farmer.”110  Taylor continued, explaining that the 
Louisiana purchase had made the western lands a “veritable promise land” however, the trade 
disagreements between England, France, and the United States forced prices of produce so low 
that when these farmers went to market they saw their “venture was a failure.”111  These market 
conditions had been the result of Jefferson’s Embargo and Non-Intercourse acts, but Taylor 
explained that these “peaceful methods” were viewed by many as necessary weapons against 
“the European belligerents”112 Taylor concluded when peaceful methods failed “the hopeful 
settlers of earlier years became the War Hawks of 1812.”113  
 Unsatisfied with where the historiography on the causes of the war of 1812 was heading, 
historian Warren H. Goodman wrote “The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing 
Interpretations” in 1941.  Goodman’s work focused on the effect that Henry Adam’s work had 
on the interpretations of what caused the war.  Goodman asserted that “the two decades 
following the publication of Adam’s work form[ed] a period of confusion in the history of the 
interpretation of the War of 1812.”114  Quoting Roosevelt’s take on the interpretations of the 
cause of the war, “The grounds of the war were singularly uncertain” Goodman argued that the 
main fruits of Adam’s efforts were “a feeling of insecurity on the part of those historians who 
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took their stand on the maritime rights interpretation.”115  While Goodman noted that Henry 
Adams’ work was “sufficiently influenced by the traditional interpretation” explaining that 
Adams argued “had Great Britain revoked the Orders in Council in March 1812, no war could 
have taken place, unless it were a war with France” Goodman also shone a light on the fact that  
“Adams was the first to imply that the plan for the conquest of Canada had been a contributing 
cause of the war rather than a method of carrying on a struggle undertaken for other reasons.”116  
Goodman continued, writing that “Adams seem[d] to have been the first to recognize that an 
interpretation of the causes of the War of 1812 almost exclusively on the basis of maritime 
matters was an oversimplification and, consequently, a distortion….his own treatment of the 
subject was rather a modified acceptance of the orthodox thesis than abandonment of it.”117 
Specifically, Goodman wanted to show the glaring faults he saw within Howard T. Lewis, Julius 
Pratt and George Rodger Taylor’s work.   
 Goodman asserted that “in 1911 historians came to a fork in the hitherto single road to an 
understanding of the cause of the war of 1812.  Howard T. Lewis set out in a direction which had 
not been travelled before when he declared that the war had been fought mainly because the 
West coveted the agricultural land reserves of Canada.”118  As suggested in this essay, Lewis 
argued that the maritime rights explanation failed to explain why the war was supported by 
southerners and westerners.  Lewis concluded that “the key to the situation was to be found in 
the imperative demand for more territory into which the western immigrant might go and still be 









While Goodman acknowledged that “it cannot be denied that the War of 1812 was less 
popular in New York and New England…to consider the struggle [for war[ solely a project of 
the West is laboring the point…that section alone could not have mustered the 79 votes cast in 
the House of Representatives.”120  Goodman also argued that historians treating the conquest of 
Canada as a newly adopted idea that had originated in the west failed to note that “the conquest 
of Canada was widely discussed and openly advocated in the South as early as the summer of 
1807,” using a toast from Richmond on July 4, 1807 in which a man toasted “the memory of 
General Montgomery who nobly perished under the walls of Quebec.  Equal glory and better 
fortune to these heroes who man soon have to follow in his footsteps.”121  Goodman’s footnotes 
on the matter show that the toast had been printed in the Enquirer on July 24, 1807, with one 
editor who “went so far as to present a detailed plan for military operation against Canada.”122  
Goodman’s conclusion showed that there was proof such an idea had already permeated 
throughout southern society years before westerners had expressed any desire to expand 
territory. 
 Next, Goodman set out to disprove Julius Pratt’s theory that the southern and western 
support for the war was due to expansionist efforts and fears concerning the potential threat from 
Tecumseh’s confederacy, believed to be instigated by British agitators.  For this, Goodman 
firstly conceded that these were generally understood to be “contributing causes.”123  However, 
he argued that those praising Pratt’s work failed to heed Pratt’s own warning, that the text “ 
ma[de] no effort to give a full account of the causes of the War of 1812, but deals with one set of 
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causes only.”124  Goodman continued, writing “granting the tenability of Pratt’s conclusions in 
their entirety, the quest for a well-integrated presentation of the causes of the war is not ended.  
A long step in the right direction has been made, but the task of fitting Pratt’s one set of causes 
into the whole picture remains to be done.”125 
 In response to George Rogers Taylor, Goodman recognized the value of Taylor’s 
contribution to the historiography of the causes of the war.  He wrote “Taylor had shown that the 
British orders and French decrees caused a contraction of the market for western staples and, 
consequently, a decline in prices and an economic depression.  The westerner believed his 
economic hardship could be alleviated by forcing a repeal.”126  While Goodman did not dispute 
Taylor’s work, he concluded that like Pratt “Taylor’s conclusions must be considered in the light 
of his own statement that he was dealing with but one set of causes and that factors other than 
those emphasized in his study undoubtedly played a part in bringing on the war.”127  In fact, 
Goodman noted that Taylor’s argument proved how westerners were, contrary to what many 
historians had written before, directly affected by the maritime issues that existed at the time.128 
 Goodman ended his article abruptly, almost angrily, clearly showing his frustrations and 
calling for a “complete reexamination of the sources.”129  Goodman concluded that “the 
foregoing survey hardly explains the genesis of the War of 1812.  Until a definitive study of the 
sources is made, historians will have to be content with [Woodrow] Wilson’s statement that the 
grounds of the war were singularly uncertain.”130   
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Professor Alfred Leroy Burt, a Canadian historian, emerged challenging the “departure 
from maritime causes.”131  Burt vehemently opposed the emerging viewpoints of the time, such 
as Julius Pratt’s, that blamed Native Americans and western aims for the war.  Burt’s work had 
been in publication, being released right around the time as Goodman’s article, but the fact that 
the two historians came to similar conclusions at the same time, shows not only the merit their 
theories held, but also confirms the trend that occurred in the historiography of the causes of the 
war during this time period.  Burt primarily argued that theories such as Pratt’s did not give 
enough weight to the events that were occurring between France and England during this time 
period.132  A.L. Burt wrote “Issues and the Evolution of Causes of the War of 1812” with the 
mission of refuting Pratt’s thesis, that Western aims and “native aggressors” were what caused 
the war.  Instead, Burt returned to a more classic view, arguing that impressment and trade 
aggressions were the cause.  His approach focused on examining a larger world view.  Burt 
explained “To understand the French decrees and the British Orders-in-Council we should 
remember that they accompanied the approach of the supreme crisis in the life and death struggle 
between the two powers which were then by far the greatest on earth.”133  In essence, Burt 
argued the United States was caught in the middle with both “belligerents coercing neutrals to 
serve its own end.”134  A.L. Burt’s text attempted to remain neutral, hoping to explain how 
certain events could have felt as if belligerent nations were attempting to take advantage of the 
United States’ neutrality.  Burt’s text supplied his readers with a variety of primary sources with 
a focus on British primary sources. 
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 Burt wrote quite bluntly that the fault, in fact, lay squarely on Napoleon’s shoulders.  His 
“fantastic” inverted blockade, which was ordered to seize all British goods “and also under pain 
of confiscation, the exclusion of every ship that touched at a British port” effectively denied 
Britain access “to the European market on which her economic life depended.”135  Burt asserted 
that this “Continental System” Napoleon created was sure to destroy the British nation as they 
were completely dependent on the manufacturing of goods and trading them to survive, noting 
that “the Orders-In-Council were her desperate reply.”136 
 The Orders-In-Council, Burt charged, made “the position of neutrals impossible.”137  Burt 
explained that the “real issue was the Continental System.  Would they cooperate with Napoleon 
in upholding it, or with Britain in undermining it?”138  Neutral American merchant vessels 
“could not approach any European port that was under Napoleon’s sway without being liable to 
seizure, either outside by a ship of the Royal Navy or inside by Napoleon’s officials; inside, if it 
had touched at a British port, or had procured British papers; outside, if it had not.”139  Burt 
explained the impossibility of the situation, writing “It was a choice between the devil and the 
deep sea.”140   
Burt continued, explaining that while “both belligerents this time flouted the United 
States” with both being “equally oppressive; but practically, legally, and psychologically they 
were not.  Britain’s control of the sea, being greater than Napoleon’s control of the land, gave her 
greater power of enforcement.”141  Until this point, Burt placed both belligerents at fault with the 
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majority of fault falling on Napoleon.  However, Burt wrote that there were significant legal 
differences in the search and seizure of neutral ships.  Burt claimed that England’s “seizures 
were made at sea and therefore, according to her own admission, were a violation of neutral 
rights under international law.”142  Napoleon’s search and seizures, on the other hand, occurred 
almost exclusively in ports “within the undoubted jurisdiction of his own or a subordinate 
government.”143 
 Burt wrote that “Americans were convinced that Britain was abusing her temporary 
belligerent rights to serve her permanent economic interest and that in doing so she was furtively 
dealing a dangerous blow at their country. They saw her trying, under cover of the war, to 
monopolize the commerce of the world.”144  Burt attempted  to explain some of the decisions 
that came out of Britain, noting that the British were “exasperated by the paradox of their 
position” in hopes of reminding readers that the British did not act out of aggression.145  He 
continued, writing “Never had they possessed such complete control of the sea, yet more than 
ever the sea-borne trade of the enemy was escaping from their grasp.”146   
The Americans, however, did not share Burt’s perspective.  Burt argued that the “Royal 
Navy was supreme…and she held the world in fee.  It is not surprising, therefore, that non-
British eyes saw in the orders-in-council a new and ruthless protection of old and selfish British 
design.”  This was where the cause of the war truly fell, in Burt’s eyes.  The Orders-In-Council 
“were particularly offensive.  The reason for their peculiar sensitiveness lay in their own history: 
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they were being forced back into the dependence of colonial days.”147  Burt summarized what he 
believed the cause of the War of 1812 was in one succinct sentence: “American Independence 
was at Stake!”148 
  
 
147 Ibid, p.72. 
148 Ibid, p.72. 
36 
 
Chapter 3: The Sixties Renews Interest 
 Braford Perkins published his text Prologue to War in 1961.  As noted in his preface, 
Perkins wrote that he sought to answer Warren H. Goodman’s call for “a comprehensive work on 
the subject …to correlate and synthesize the various sets of causes.”149  Perkins succeeded in his 
work, which was hailed by other scholars as “the most sweeping monograph published in 
decades”.150  A Harvard graduate, Perkins was an American historian whose father was also a 
historian who studied the same time period.151  Perkins criticized his predecessors, and claimed 
that “notably, no scholar since Henry Adams has examined more than the most obvious English 
materials.”152   Perkins argued that this had been a fatal flaw in historical interpretations and that 
he had “therefore devoted much of [his] attention to the development of British policy, virtually 
caricatured by too many American historians.”153  Perkins described where he found holes in the 
previous historiography, arguing “previous interpretations…seem to me inadequate.  I believe 
scholars have overemphasized the tangible, rational reasons for action and, while not ignoring, 
have given too little heed to such things as nation pride, sensitivity, and frustration.”154   
Perkins continued, noting that his work centered around one common thesis, that “the 
American search for national respectability and true independence from Europe” noting that 
“relations with Britain form[ed] the most important part of this theme” and also explaining that 
“relations with Spain and many parts of Franco-American relations, which would have 
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complicated the main story.”155 Perkins spent a large portion of his preface detailing the sources 
used for his work, which most notably included the use of materials from the Royal Archives, 
something that Perkins noted had not been done before.156  Perkins wrote that the two of the most 
important historical studies were those of Henry Adams and Alfred L. Burt.157  Perkins also 
explained where he believed his predecessors fell short.  While acknowledging that “no student 
of these years can fail to owe a great debt to Henry Adams” Perkins exquisitely explained 
Adams’ shortcomings, noting that “Adams is almost unreservedly hostile toward the Republican 
leaders and, as Irving Brant has shown, is not above shading the evidence in a fashion modern 
historians would consider improper.”158   
Acknowledging the contribution Adams had made with his examination of British 
manuscripts, Perkins wrote that Adams’ “attitude toward England is colored with the nationalism 
of the period in which he wrote.”159  As previously written about in this essay, one may also 
safely come to the conclusion that Adams’ beliefs were most likely not only shaped by the time 
in which he wrote, but also by the beliefs of his ancestors.  As far as Burt was concerned, Perkins 
explained that “his work, with a few exceptions on the British side, rests primarily on printed 
materials, both primary and secondary.  His judgements are judicious, but Burt perhaps fails to 
capture the emotional fire of the period.”160  In fact, Perkins criticized most of his colleagues, 
arguing that “historians of Anglo- American relations have far less frequently exploited British 
manuscripts.”161  Perkins also noted that “the position of Spencer Perceval and his allies has 
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recently become much more understandable with the gathering of the premier’s papers” which 
Perkins had been granted access to through the Queen.162  Perkins discussed the “War Hawks” a 
clique of young republicans who repeatedly and loudly called for war, however Perkins 
concluded that “national honor was the War Hawks’ central concern.”163 
Perkins explained that the “war came, not because of the President, but despite him… 
The war came, not for any single reason, but from the interplay of many.  The nation did not 
want war, and surely it did not embark gleefully on a great crusade.  Tired of the self-flagellation 
and the disgrace that had marked the yeads since 1805, propelled by the fear of ridicule for 
inconsistency and by an honest interest in the nation’s honor, a sufficient number of 
congressmen allowed themselves to support war.”164 After extensive examination of primary 
sources from both nations, Bradford Perkins concluded that while “neither side sought the War 
of 1812, in the short run it was tragically unnecessary.”165 
 While examining the current historical trends of the 1960s, historian Irwin Unger 
explained how “social sciences have profoundly influenced complex views of the past…enabling 
the new generation of historians to obscure conflict in America by psychoanalyzing it.”166  Unger 
argued that this “shift in analysis of conflict reduced the emotional charge of past historical 
events” making it more difficult to separate the “heroes” from the “villains.”167  When examining 
the context of Perkins’ conclusion, it is clear that the trends in 1960s American historiography 
 
162 Ibid, p.444. 
163 Ibid, p.347. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Perkins, p.426. 
166Irwin Unger, “The ‘New Left’ and American History: Some Recent Trends in United States Historiography,” The 




influenced how Perkins interpreted the actions of the British, forcing him to see their side of the 
conflict and the struggle for England’s existence against Napoleon.   
English born historian Reginald Horsman’s 1962 text The Causes of the War of 1812 was 
also critical of the historiography that so far existed concerning the causes of the war.  Horsman 
believed that one fatal atrocity had been committed by the American historians, they had failed 
to look outside their own shores, and he continued the trend of post Goodman scholars hoping to 
find the cause of the war outside of the United States.  Horsman charged “previous historians” (a 
statement that appears to be directed at Julius Pratt and his Expansionists of 1812) with placing 
far too large of an overemphasis on western expansion as a cause for the War.  While noting the 
“considerable effort” previous authors had put forth to “differentiate between a number of 
possible American causes,” Horsman asserted that the true cause had been completely passed 
by.168  
Horsman thoroughly examined many sources from both United States politicians, as well 
as British diplomats and came to one conclusion.  While Pratt had been correct that “a bitter 
anger arose in America at Indian hostilities” and he had also been correct that “the idea of 
conquering Canada had been present,” Horsman argued that “the conquest of Canada was 
primarily a means of waging war, not a reason for starting it.”169  Horsman continued, 
concluding his work with the following bold statement: “British policy, though influenced by 
jealousy of American commercial growth, stemmed primarily from the necessity of waging war 
against France.  Had there been no war with France, there would have been no Orders in 
Council, no impressment, and, in all probability, no War of 1812.”170 
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While Horsman’s argument reflected many of the same sentiments that had recently been 
written by Gilbert Auchinleck, Horsman’s work did reflect the pattern of change at the time that 
was also seen in Bradford Perkin’s work.  Both historians seemed to have been set on attempting 
to reconcile both American and British actions, and also sought to severely decrease the 
emphasis on western aims as the cause, reminding historians to heed the warning Pratt had 
placed in his own work.171     
In 1964, Roger H. Brown’s The Republic in Peril: 1812 was published.  Brown’s work 
had not only been inspired by the recent trend called for by Goodman to re-examine the sources 
on the cause for the war, but also by another trend in historiography.  In his preface, Brown 
acknowledged a recent article from historian Cecelia Kenyon, “Republicanism and Radicalism in 
the American Revolution: An Old-Fashioned Interpretation.”  Brown wrote that Kenyon’s article 
had inspired his thoughts in his text by “suggesting the importance of republicanism in the 
American Revolution.”172  Through this new lens, Brown argued that his text worked in 
conjunction with Kenyon’s, “reinforcing” one another and that they “form a coherent pattern of 
new interpretation in the history of the Revolutionary and early national periods.”173  As for 
Brown’s belief on what led to the declaration of war in 1812, Brown noted that his work “shows 
for the first time how republicanism and concern for the republican experiment led to the 
American decision to declare war on Great Britain in 1812.”174  Brown also cautioned his readers 
that his work did “not attempt to be a full account of the diplomatic controversy that led to war 
nor of the political and parliamentary maneuvering that produced the final war declaration.”175   
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While using his “republicanism” lens, Brown claimed that Jeffersonian republicans “felt 
a heavy responsibility in challenging British and French maritime practices.”176 Brown 
continued, declaring that “In their eyes the prestige of the Republic and of their own party 
depended on protection of American commerce against the restrictions and seizures of the 
European belligerents.  They could have imagined no more momentous a task.”177  As Brown 
saw it, President Jefferson, and the current Secretary of State at the time, James Madison, “were 
confidant” that their embargo would “instill respect for [America’s] maritime rights.”178 
Brown also devoted his conclusion to illustrate the many ways the nation had been so 
divided along party lines during its formative years.  He described what he called a “party 
conflict” that was a “very different phenomenon from today’s political contests between 
Democrats and Republicans…spirit of part ran high, divided families, neighborhoods, towns & 
states” with Brown even describing weddings and funerals that were boycotted due to mixing of 
people with differing political beliefs.179  While Brown’s work may not have entirely been 
focused on refuting the specific trends of historiography that were occurring amongst those 
studying the causes of the War of 1812, his work does an excellent job on focusing his reader on 
the political animosity that existed at the time.  
 In 1965, military history professor Harry L. Coles published his text The War of 1812.  
Following the path of recent historians, Coles opened his work with the following statement “the 
War of 1812 resulted from the unsuccessful efforts of the United States to maintain its interests 
and its honor in a world divided into two-armed camp.  Both in its origins and in the way it was 
fought, the war was an outgrowth of a General European conflict that raged from 1793 to 
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1815.”180 Coles continued, writing that although the reasons for the coming of the war were 
“many and complicated,” his also noted that while “historians are by no means in agreement on 
the relative weight to be attributed to various factors, they have in general discussed two sets of 
causes: maritime grievances and western aims.”181  Like Perkins, Coles reframed the Napoleonic 
wars, declaring that the British saw their fight as one between good and evil.  Attempting to 
convey the feelings of the British at the time, Coles explained “since Britain fought for the right, 
it was plainly the duty of other nations, particularly the United States, which owed its very 
existence to Britain, to subordinate national goals to the interest of the struggle which was being 
waged on behalf of mankind.”182  Again, echoing the work of those before him, Coles concluded 
that the United States became a weapon that one European superpower hoped to wield to attack 
the other, writing “unable to get at one another directly, each side attempted to bring the enemy 
to terms by means of economic strangulation.”183   
What set Coles work apart from the other historiography of this time period was his 
thoughts on President Thomas Jefferson’s embargo.  Coles asserted that “all the founding 
fathers, whether Federalist of Republican, agreed on a policy of non-involvement in European 
conflicts.”184  Coles charged that the politicians at the time believed it extremely likely that they 
would be pulled into a conflict between the two European nations despite their best efforts to 
avoid conflict.  As such, Coles argued that “they felt that a period of isolation was desirable in 
order that the United States achieve and maintain freedom of action, freedom to choose, as 
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Washington put it, war or peace as their interest might dictate” at least giving them the 
appearance of having the ability to make their own choice as an independent nation.185  
 Coles also explained why President Jefferson did not adequately prepare for war.  To 
Coles the answer was simple, his “doctrine demanded an alternative to war.”186  While 
Federalists called for the nation to ready for war, Coles noted “the Republicans could not accept 
this because armies and navies meant encouraging militarism, contracts for private business at 
public expense, and high taxes, all of which they loathed.”187  While agreeing with previous 
historians (such as Henry Adams) that the notion of peaceable coercion through an embargo was 
a “noble experiment” Coles argued that Jefferson’s embargo “accomplished nothing 
diplomatically but nearly succeeded in turning the American people against one another.”188  
Coles’ work was favored by educators for decades due to its depth of research and readability. 
Sensing a need to refocus the historiography, in 1974 Clifford L. Egan published his 
article “The Origins of the War of 1812: Three Decades of Historical Writing.”  Egan wrote that 
his paper had three goals in mind: “to provide a guide to the work that has accumulated since 
Goodman’s essay, to present the major and minor issues that historians believed figured in the 
origins of the second Anglo-American conflict, and to suggest further research opportunities.”189  
Egan most importantly acknowledged how Burt’s book had been published at the same time as 
Goodman’s article, and credited Burt for accomplishing just what Goodman had called for, a full 
refutation of Pratt’s thesis set forth in his 1925 Expansionists of 1812.  Egan also praised and 
criticized Perkins’ work.  While acknowledging the depth of Perkins’ British research, Egan 
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noted that western and southern sources were lacking.  Egan also claimed that author accepted 
partisan Federalist views of Jefferson and Madison.190  As for Reginald Horsman’s text, Egan 
called it “judicious and concise.”191   
A bit before his time, Egan wrote that he had been excited for the attention Madison had 
been recently receiving for his role in the start of war, explaining that although historians had not 
been able to “reach a general agreement on Madison,” the examination of sources on that subject 
would prove interesting.192  Eagan noted that the historiography had specifically fallen short in 
examining Franco-American relations during the Napoleonic era, and called for historians to 
conduct such a study, one he believed would “place the events prior to 1812 in a new 
perspective.”193  Nine years later, Egan answered his own call. 
Clifford L. Egan’s 1983 book Neither Peace Nor War: Franco-American Relations, 
1803-1812 hoped to fill a hole the author saw in the current narrative, and explain France’s role 
in the decision to call for war.  Egan concluded that “some observations are in order about the 
decision for war.  A declaration of war was not the miraculous event some historians have 
portrayed it to be rather the miracle was that American patience with the belligerents lasted so 
long.”194  Egan continued, explaining that “the primary causes of the War of 1812 were the 
issues of American national honor, the sense of humiliation suffered at the hands of Great Britain 
in the forms of impressment and the violation of neutral rights.”195  Egan’s work does a brilliant 
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England, absolving all politicians of any wrongdoing and claiming that no matter what had 
happened “the longer Anglo-French hostilities endured, the greater the risk became for America 
because the cross-channel foes would enforce ever more Draconian and confusing economic 
measures to crush each other.”196 
 In 1983 J.C.A. Stagg published Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in 
the Early American Republic 1783-1830.  This study was unique in that for the first time the 
focus was heavily turned to Madison, and his involvement in British relations since 1783.  Stagg 
wrote that initially he had hoped to produce a study that examined “the operational histories of 
[the war’s] various military and naval campaigns.”197  However, the author explained that he 
soon became “preoccupied with conflicting theories of causation” describing this existing 
historiography as a “tangled matter.”198  Stagg wrote that he then decided to research two topics 
he believed desperately needed to be further explained.  Stagg noted the following two questions 
that inspired his work, “first is why James Madison believed he could win a war against Great 
Britain, and win it, moreover, by seizing Canada.  The second deals with why the war occurred 
when it did.”199  Here, Stagg was referencing critics of the maritime theory as the cause of the 
war of 1812.  Many of them argued that if impressment of American sailors had been the main 
cause of the war, then why had war not been declared when the Chesapeake incident had 
occurred several years prior to the start of the war, especially when many felt the situation had 
not been properly settled?  Stagg’s work explained both of these issues thoroughly. 
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 Stagg charged Madison with wanting to bring Great Britain to heel by “invading and 
occupying Great Britain’s Canadian possessions” referencing a letter James Monroe wrote to 
John Taylor on June 13, 1812, in which Monroe informed Taylor that Canada was seen “not as 
an object of the war but as a means to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion.”200  The author 
continued, asserting that Madison had  established diplomatic goals for the young nation in the 
1790s, writing that his “single most important diplomatic goal” was “American entry into the 
carrying trade of the British West Indies.”201  Stagg continued, noting that Madison referenced 
the effectiveness of a brief embargo passed by Congress in 1794 in letters at the time, relaying 
his elation that the embargo had quickly led to “very different language from Britain,” as the 
embargo had caused scarcities of essential supplies in Britain’s West Indies colonies.202  Stagg 
wrote that the sugar trade in the West Indies was far too valuable for the British to not concede to 
the Americans, noting that as this had worked so successfully in 1794, Madison and Jefferson 
had no reason to believe that their embargo would be any less effective.  Stagg concluded that 
Madison believed he had discovered what could finally destroy the British empire and elevate 
the position of the Americans in the world, “Madison concluded that Britain could only remain 
prosperous so long as its navigation could constantly enlarge its markets, monopolize the trade 
routes of the world, and the rely on the Royal Navy for protection.”203 
  Stagg wrote that “Madison did not want the embargo to give way to war” however, the 
author also acknowledged that Madison “seriously miscalculated both the unpopularity of the 
measure in the northern states and the problems of enforcing it.”204  This, is what the author 
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concluded to be behind the cause of Madison’s desire to invade Canada. As far as the timing of 
the war, the author argued that it was merely Madison’s hopes that war would never have to be 
an option.  The years that followed the Chesapeake incident had been filled with negotiations in 
an attempt to avoid war at all costs, Stagg argued, noting that Madison even explained to “the 
British minister that the United States was in no position to commence hostilities.”205  Cementing 
his argument, Stagg referenced a letter Madison wrote almost a month before his death, to 
Congressman Charles Jared Ingersoll.  The former president, thrilled with recent political events 
wrote that “Britain could no longer hope to continue [to be] mistress of the seas…the trident, 
must pass to this hemisphere where is may be hoped it will be less abused than it had been on the 
other.”206 
 Donald R. Hickey’s The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, was first published in 1989.  
Hickey noted in the preface of his text, that he had become interested in the history of the war 
during the late 1960s when the historiography from the field was being published at a significant 
rate. Dr. Hickey wrote that his book was an attempt to provide a “needed…broader treatment of 
the war- one that dealt with politics, diplomacy, economics, and finance as well as battles and 
campaigns…a study, in other words, that more fully explored Republican politics and their 
impact on the nation.”207  What made Hickey’s work particularly special, was the audience the 
author had in mind.  Hickey wrote that he had hoped the text would serve as a “short, 
comprehensive study” that would be suitable for “students and others interested in a general 
overview of the war. Hickey had also hoped his work would prove to be an important study that 
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“reexamines the sources and contains new material…in short, this work is designed to be both a 
textbook and a monograph and to appeal to generalists and specialists alike.”208   
 As for the causes of the war, Hickey wrote that the reason the War of 1812 remains “our 
most obscure war” is partly due to the fact “that its causes are shrouded in mystery.”209  Hickey 
explained that despite this obscurity, we should not be blinded to the war’s “significance” as he 
believed the war to have been “an important turning point, a great watershed, in the history of the 
young republic.”210  When writing about the cause of the war, rather than present any new ideas, 
Hickey simply reiterated the current prevailing causes, maritime concerns.  As this monograph 
was intended to be a text that would be accessible to a those from a variety of educational 
backgrounds, Hickey concisely presents an account of the various decrees and orders that 
infringed on American trading rights.  In the end, Hickey’s work simply echoed what had 
already been presented by other historians.  Criticizing the Americans, Hickey wrote “not only 
did Republicans misread British intentions, but throughout this turbulent era they consistently 
overrated America’s ability to win concessions.”211  As for Hickey’s opinions on the actions of 
the British, he wrote “her aim was not to subvert American independence but to win the war in 
Europe.  Once this objective was achieved, her infringements on American rights would cease,” 
again echoing the findings of other historians from two and a half decades earlier.212 
In an article entitled “The War of 1812 Revisited” War of 1812 historian Reginald 
Horseman not only revisited his text The Causes of the War of 1812, but he also offered an 
interesting critique of Donald Hickey’s The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict.  After over three 
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decades studying the War, Horseman explained that he had “sometimes wondered if the flow of 
books and articles on the War of 1812 can possibly be never ending.”213 He continued, 
explaining that “the causes of that strange little war have been interpreted, reinterpreted, and re-
reinterpreted by a variety of historians.”214  His major critique with Hickey’s work was that it 
lacked any “striking new interpretation” but rather seemed to simply fill the hole Hickey 
believed to be existing in the historiography at the time, a “modern, broader treatment of the 
war.”215   
Horseman critiqued what he called the “least satisfactory part of the book,” the two 
chapters were Hickey had examined the coming of the War of 1812.  Horseman scolded Hickey 
for his failure to place “his own imprint” when discussing the causes of the war and argued that 
Hickey had simply “[tried] to achieve a balance between [explaining] the various arguments 
advanced by earlier historians.”216  After his critique of what he described as Hickey’s 
“smorgasbord” approach in analyzing the causes, Horseman noted that he believed Hickey had 
supported the same argument that Bradford Perkins popularized, which had been that the cause 
of the war was due to the way the Republicans responded to various foreign affairs crises, 
specifically the Monroe-Pickney Treaty, Horsman explained.217 Horseman continued, writing 
that Hickey had a “problem of perspective” which was “particularly noticeable in the omission of 
any general attempt to integrate” British perspective in his “American-oriented” research.218  The 
only thing that Horsman seemed to have appreciated about Hickey’s monograph, was that it was 
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“up to date” with the arguments, while also being accessible to readers of any educational 
background. 
 Perhaps a more interesting topic in this article was Reginald Horsman’s reexamination of 
his own 1960s work, The Causes of War of 1812.  Horsman explained that “since that time, I 
have altered some of my views.”219  Horsman wrote that because “Pratt’s arguments were so 
persuasive and influential that for forty years historians overreacted in their efforts to place the 
causes of the war back within the context of the European wars and British maritime policies.”220 
After taking several decades to reflect, Horsman concluded that “I now believe that there were 
many politicians in the United States who saw the invasion and retention of Canada as a useful 
side benefit of a war that had become necessary largely because of British maritime policies” 
showing a meshing of the ideas that had emerged in the 1960s along with the arguments 
presented by Pratt.221  Horsman also acknowledged the influence Stagg’s work had on his 
opinion, writing that his arguments convinced him that Madison and Jefferson found value in the 
acquisition of Canada.  As for the future, Horsman declared that “a regional approach to the war 
of 1812 era would seem to offer more chances for a new contribution than the Sisyphean labor of 
constantly reappraising and rearranging the causes.”222  As time would have it, Horsman was 
somewhat correct, as the works that were released in the next decades did begin to examine other 
aspects of the war. 
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Chapter 4: Bicentennial Anniversary Renews Interest 
 While historians in the end of the twentieth and early twenty first century did produce 
some studies on the War of 1812, these works tended to examine topics that focused on naval 
and military strategy, rather that attempting to decipher the causes of the war.223  However, the 
nearing of the anniversary of the War of 1812 drew fresh perspectives from a new generation of 
historians.  Works in the twenty first century have provided a plethora of new topics concerning 
the War of 1812.  From the involvement of women in the war, to the involvement of slaves vs. 
freed men, to the involvement of differencing religious groups such as the Baptists, historians 
seem to be answering Reginald Horsman’s call to contribute something “new” to the 
conversation on the war.   
While the new generation tended to focus less on reassessing the causes, a few works that 
have emerged over the last decade have tended to agree with the idea that “maritime grievances” 
were at the root of the conflict.  These historians seemed to follow a pattern of focusing less 
attention on Jefferson’s involvement, and more starting to scrutinize James Madison’s every 
move for more than a decade before the war.  Historians at this time also seem to agree that to 
some extent “American exceptionalism” played a role not only the declaration, but also the 
ability of the war to gain popularity and traction with the masses.   
 In Jeremy Black’s The War of 1812 in The Age of Napoleon, Black attempted to place the 
confusion concerning the cause of the war within a larger context.  Black noted “in particular, it 
is necessary to look at the character of American society and public culture, because these 
explain much about the drive to war and about the nature of the conflict.”224  Black argued that 
 
223Lawrence B.A. Hatter, “Party Like It’s 1812: The War at 200,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 71, no. 2 (2012): 90–
111, http://www.jstor.org/stable/42628248. 
224 Jeremy Black, The War of 1812 In The Age of Napoleon (Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), 10. 
52 
 
the cause of the war, while “a matter of historical debate,” was due to “a key element.”225  
According to Black “Jefferson and others overestimated American power after his success in 
acquiring Louisiana from France in 1803.”226  Black continued, noting that “while Jefferson 
understood the potential of the West and was correct in his long-term appraisal that the USA 
would become a world power, he mistook Americas marginal leverage in the bipolar dynamic 
between Britain and France for a situation in which all three were major powers,” a mistake that 
Black believed caused the embargo disaster, and eventually the war.227   
As many historians before him had done, Black argued that Jefferson’s student and 
successor, Madison, “followed his reasoning reflexively.”228  Black asserted that Jefferson and 
Madison “saw little reason to compromise,” with both European belligerents, with the men 
falsely assuming “Britain would back down in the face of American anger and preparations for 
war.”229 Black argued that it was at this point that the two men learned “that they could not 
dictate the pace of events.”230  In defense of the British, Black wrote that the British did indeed 
compromise, however it was dismissed as “inadequate” and “too late,” by Madison.231 
 Another important factor that contributed to the start of war in 1812 was, according to 
Black, due to simple “visceral hatred” between men from both nations.  Black blamed both the 
British Prime Minister Spencer Perceval and the British Foreign Secretary Richard Marquess 
Wellesley for their “visceral anti-Americanism” as well as Jefferson and Madison for their 
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“visceral hatred of Great Britain.”232 Black charged that the maritime and trade “hostilities” were 
much more difficult to negotiate due to the history of “harmed relations” that existed between the 
men at the time.233  Black wrote that specific animosity between both those in the British and 
American governments had obviously been festering for decades as they had all been involved in 
the “bitter” Revolutionary war as adversaries.234   
 Black explained that eventually Madison’s thoughts on the situation changed, mostly due 
to the “domestic pressures” the resulted from the failed embargo.235  Black argued that current 
affairs had led “Jeffersonians to fear for the survival of the republic.  Unsuccessful as a tool of 
foreign policy, non-importation had also resulted in major economic stains, and this was 
increasing opposition to the government,” which all caused Madison to reverse course.236  Black 
wrote that Madison also feared for the future of his party as Federalists seemed to be gaining 
some traction in elections.237  Black concluded that Madison was therefore left with only two 
choices, “back down or force Britain to back down.”238  Firmly rebuking Madison’s decision, 
Black argued that Madison “underestimated the risks of the latter and failed to appreciate the 
prudence of the former.”239  To Black, it was clear that American exceptionalism led Madison 
down the wrong path many times, ultimately leading to war. 
As for Congress’ support for the war, Black again circled back to his idea of misplaced 
American confidence.  He argued that while the Congressional War Hawks had been fueled by 
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Republicans.”240  Black noted that their party outrage was generally geared towards 
impressment, as it had “been seen as a particular outrage, as it represented an infringement of the 
national sovereignty of American vessels and a denial of America’s ability to naturalize 
foreigners.”241 
 Black also took this opportunity to discuss the possibility that Native Americans had been 
instigated by the British, thus leading to an outbreak of war.  This echoed the “savage native” 
argument that had been popularized by historians in the early twentieth century.  Black 
somewhat dismissed this idea, but also acknowledged that some truth may indeed be there.  He 
wrote that “the activities of British officials, officers, and traders on the frontier that, in large 
part, justifie[d] these suspicions.”242   
Black continued his explanation, writing that the “British instigators” had at one point 
been “former officers” in the British Army and had “surrendered at Yorktown in 1781,” thus, 
according to Black, they developed a resentment for Americans and instigated “native agitators” 
when it suited them.243  Black scoffed at the idea that this had been a larger conspiracy set forth 
by the British government and specifically refuted the idea that the British had anything to do 
with the rise in popularity the “nativist movement that centered on Tecumseh and, even more, his 
brother, Tenskwatawa, the Prophet.”244  Black argued that the most concrete proof that Native 
American relations had nothing to do with the declaration of war resided in Madison’s war 
message to Congress, in which he made “no reference to problems with Native Americans in his 
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case for preparedness.”245  Black instead argued that the increase in Native American tensions 
was a natural consequence, a direct cause of American expansion.  Black also noted that rather 
than a “cause of the War of 1812,” Native American tensions was more of a “background” to the 
war.246   
Concluding his explanation of the cause of the War of 1812, Black introduced a final 
theory that seemed to explain the cause of the war.  He wrote “aside from the specific issues in 
dispute…there was a more general sense, particularly among the Jeffersonians, that the 
Revolution was unfinished because Britain remained powerful; and that this power threatened 
American interests and public morality as Britain was corrosive but seductive model of un-
American activity.” 247  Black had decided that moniker of “Revolutionary War II” fit the War of 
1812 nicely, explaining that it was simply a result of so much unfinished business. 
 In Paul A. Gilje’s 2010 article “Free Trade and Sailors' Rights: The Rhetoric of the War 
of 1812,” the author also examined the causes of the War of 1812.  In this article, Gilje asserted 
that the answer to “what caused the war” was easily found in a popular saying that existed 
amongst American sailors at the time: “free trade and sailors’ rights.”248 Gilje argued that the 
slogan was embraced “by common people” and that its “resonance” was due to the fact that the 
chant was reminiscent of ideals that had “represented important aspects of Revolutionary 
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it on their flags, Gilje also explained that the embargo and non-intercourse act all issued before 
the “outbreak of war” all sought the same result “the desire for free trade.”250 
 As for the “sailors’ rights” part of the chant, Gilje explained that while this statement had 
obvious “revolutionary implications,” it also served as “a low culture message meant to rile 
aristocrat[ic]” British Navy officers who had been charged with the tasks of searching American 
ships.251  Gilje continued arguing his point by providing James Madison’s war message, in which 
the President claimed that “thousands of American citizens under the safeguard of public law and 
of their national flag have been torn from their country, and from everything dear to them.”252  
To Gilje, this was irrefutable proof that Madison was finally admitting something must be done 
to guarantee government protection for sailors.   
Gilje also provided a quote from one of Henry Clay’s speeches in 1813 to support his 
sailors’ rights argument.  Gilje wrote that Clay declared “if we fail, let us fail like men, lash 
ourselves to our gallant tars, and expire together in one common struggle, fighting for ‘Seamen’s 
rights and free trade.”253  To Gilje this again proved how dedicated Washington was to their 
commitment to Sailors and trade, cementing the idea that this had been the main driver to declare 
war.  While a short article, Gilje provided a unique and interesting perspective that attempted to 
take a “history from the bottom up” approach to determining what may have been the cause of 
the war. 
 Gilje continued his study on the War of 1812 for the next few years, and in 2013 he 
published his book Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights in the War of 1812.  In the introduction of his 
text, the reader quickly learns that Gilje has almost completely changed his opinion on what had 
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been the cause of the war.  The author explained “the origins of the war were complex and 
entailed more than the slogan free trade and sailors’ rights waving from Porter's masthead.”254  
Continuing, Gilje wrote that he had changed views and had now seen what some other historians 
had explained almost a century ago. Gilje had concluded that there was some merit to the 
“expansionist” theories put forth by Julius Pratt.  He noted “in many ways the roots of the war 
lay in assorted expansionism that coveted not only Canada to the north and Florida (which 
belonged to neutral Spain) to the south, but also the Native American lands in between.”255   
Interestingly Gilje also argued for the support of yet another cause of the war, American 
Nationalism.  He wrote “for large numbers of Americans, the war also had to be fought to sustain 
the honor of the Republic that was being tested by an aggressive, arrogant and oppressive Great 
Britain (and maybe France).”256 While some historians had argued that the Americans needed to 
fight for the survival of their nation, Gilje wrote that the “honor” of the new nation was 
significantly important as well.257 
Gilje wrote that he soon saw a pattern emerge when attempting to try and pinpoint an 
exact cause for the war.  The author argued that all of these causes had been influenced by 
Enlightenment ideals.  Attempting to present his theory, he explained “The Enlightenment 
challenged the way most nations did their diplomatic business in the 18th century. Central to this 
challenge was the ideology of free trade.”258  Gilje, however, failed to completely develop this 
idea.  The author does however provide future historians with an interesting point of future 
research. 
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While Gilje was able to provide several examples to support various theories on the 
causes of the war, he still wanted to impress upon his readers the importance of Porter’s slogan, 
especially among the average American citizen at the time.  Seemingly somewhat perplexed, 
Gilje concluded, “whatever the origins of the conflict, the rhetoric during the war emphasized the 
ideals encapsulated in Porter’s motto.”259  Gilje’s evolving theory in his text examined many 
different theories that emerged over the past two centuries that all could have contributed to the 
cause of the war, but also echoed the important role “national honor” played.  
In an effort to sort the confusion surrounding the cause of the war, Gilje wrote that he 
wanted to examine the situation as a whole and even for historians to acknowledge that the 
“confusion” around the war had all been an intended.  The author claimed that it was a wider 
conspiracy, part of a larger “political game” that was being played.  Gilje argued “Republicans 
began to mold the memory of the War of 1812 as soon as the conflict ended” in an attempt to 
avoid political upheaval for their party.260  Gilje explained that the Republicans suffered a drastic 
political hit because of “the often pathetic performance of the military, the political paralysis that 
contributed to one disaster after another, and a peace treaty that settled none of the reputed 
causes of the war.”261  
While Gilje concluded that the Republicans were for the most part successful in 
obscuring their “pathetic performance” he also noted that “Federalists were outraged by this 
approach and correctly pointed out that the Treaty of Ghent ignored Porter's motto.”262 A point 
that the author admits the Federalists failed to fully capitalize on.  Ending his work, Gilje wanted 
to emphasize the complete failure of the war, again showing exactly why he believed the 
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Republicans did all that they could to obscure as many details as possible about the war, 
including details about the cause.  He concluded “issues of impressment and sailors’ rights were 
never settled; the issues simply became irrelevant after Great Britain and France ended their 
war.”263 
Noah Feldman’s 2017 biography of James Madison entitled, The Three Lives of James 
Madison, Genius, Partisan, President, sought to provide a fully detailed account of James 
Madison’s political career, starting with the years just before the Revolutionary War.  Feldman, a 
constitutional law expert who has had the “pleasure” of testifying before Congress concerning 
the founding fathers, wrote that he wanted to show the world the intellectual side of Madison.  
Feldman argued that Madison’s innate intellectual ability is what allowed him to “shape ideas 
that could be expressed through precise, reasoned argument,” which Feldman argued, is how 
Madison was able to “devise the Constitution” as well as the Bill of Rights.264  Feldman’s text 
contained a wealth of primary sources, seemingly leaving no stone unturned and providing 
readers with an extremely detailed picture of Madison.  Feldman’s work offered valuable insight 
into how Madison arrived at certain decisions, using excerpts from Madison’s letters and diary 
entries in order justify his conclusions. 
While Feldman’s work did not intentionally set out to examine and explain the cause(s) 
of the War of 1812, his study of Madison’s political choices shed some light on the situation.  
Feldman divided his text into three smaller “books” with the third and final book being mostly 
devoted to the War of 1812.  Here, Feldman wrote that he wanted to look at the embargo 
President Jefferson enacted, as well as the fallout from its abject failure.  Feldman did remind his 
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readers that importantly, Madison, not Jefferson, had been the “brains” behind the embargo, a 
fact that would later prove important in Feldman’s conclusion.   
First, Feldman wrote that he sought to vindicate the theories Madison had on the 
“possible impact” of an American embargo.  Feldman used records to prove that, indeed “prices 
skyrocketed exactly as predicted,” with a barrel of flour in the West Indies jumping from seven 
dollars before the embargo, to nearly forty after.265  Feldman explained that this ultimately 
caused a loss of about 50% of the needed supply of flour in the West Indies.  Feldman then found 
records that this trend continued with other exports such as American cotton, which “fell from a 
high of forty million pounds in 1807, when importers were frantically trying to get stocks to 
Europe in Advance of any sanctions, to just twelve million pounds in 1808.”266 Feldman also 
provided the date that showed the embargo had caused a “jump in the price of cotton in 
London.”267  Feldman concluded, “the embargo thus had an impact.  The problem was that the 
impact was not drastic enough to achieve the desired coercive effect quickly.”268  Feldman 
effectively proved that had the American economy been able to sustain the impact, Madison’s 
experiment could have proved very successful, and averted war.  Unfortunately, this was not the 
reality.   
While “Britain’s export economy was more robust, immune to external shocks than 
Madison had anticipated,” Feldman explained, the Americans were suffering as “the 
consequences of the embargo were immediate and devastating.”269  While many American 
citizens supported efforts aimed at causing harm to  England, Feldman noted that “patriotic 
 







sentiment could not restrain merchants from trying to sell their wares abroad,” causing merchants 
to seek out ways to get their goods to foreign markets illegally.270  Because merchants were 
allowed to travel between American ports, Feldman argued the “simplest” way to “avoid” the 
embargo “was therefore to stock a ship and pretend to sail for another U.S. port, then put out to 
sea and head for the West Indies, British Canada or Europe,” which many merchants did.271   
Feldman explained that at this time, the federal government lacked anyway to effectively 
enforce their embargo.  He noted that this changed six months into the embargo, when Gallatin 
explained to Jefferson and Madison that in order to enforce the embargo effectively he would 
“require both a rule that no ship could leave port at all without advance permission, and a little 
army on the Canadian border to prevent smuggling.”272  Feldman continued, writing that Gallatin 
also requested “to be able to give his officers the authority to seize goods arbitrarily on the basis 
that they were intended for illegal export, without probable cause or warrant.”273  The irony that 
Jefferson and Madison were prepared to cross their own citizens in ways similar to how the 
British had, was not lost on Feldman.  He declared that Jefferson and Madison’s “draconian 
measures…had led the Republicans to a policy of massive coercive authority over American 
citizens.”274   
Feldman also made sure to note that while these measures seemed extreme, especially 
when compared to the party ideals these men typically held, he argued that the men had 
concluded any alternative to war was the better choice for the citizens of their young nation.275 A 
war, they argued, would have far more of an impact than any measures they would be taking to 
 








enforce the embargo.  Despite all efforts, Feldman explained that the embargo never succeeded 
in its goals.  Feldman wrote that Madison’s ability to recover from the embargo politically, and 
to be elected President, was nothing short of a miracle.  The author concluded that Madison’s 
success had in fact been “buoyed by an atmosphere of enthusiasm for the end of a policy that he 
had himself initiated.”276 
 Feldman wanted to emphasize to his readers that Madison’s intentions with the embargo 
had always been pure.  He explained that Madison had simply been so set in idea that his logic 
was correct, and his embargo, “logically”, could not fail.  When it did, the need to contain the 
fallout was a matter of fighting for existence, Feldman noted.277  The author explained that 
winning the Presidency had not been a selfish goal of Madison’s.  Instead, Feldman argued that 
Madison felt an obligation.  He explained “he had not sought the presidency in fulfillment of the 
psychological drives that have powered so many into the office, for good or for ill.  He had run 
because he believed he could successfully navigate the dangerous shoals of global war.”278  
Feldman explained that Madison felt unfinished in his work of developing and designing the 
nation, and that “his broader aim was to do for American foreign policy what he had done for 
domestic governance through the Constitution: design, create, and implement a model that would 
align republican liberty and the public interest.”279  As far as Feldman was concerned, this was a 
major key in understanding the cause of the war.  He noted that while Madison had good 
intentions with his adherence to “certain principals… these principles could not resolve the 
dilemma of being caught between Britain and France…. neither would permit American 
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shipping” leaving Madison to return to square one in order to find a solution to his European 
problem.280   
 Feldman explained that at this point, “Madison needed a new account of why war was 
necessary.”281  He continued, arguing that producing an accessible, comprehensible explanation 
for the war was especially important because, although Madison was now advocating bold 
action, he had reached this conclusion only after years of exhausting every possibility of peace,” 
and as a result the American economy had taken a huge hit.282  Feldman concluded that 
Madison’s solution was “crafting a narrative that could be understood and adopted by the 
public,” arguing that “his experience in founding the Republican party had taught him the 
importance” of such a “skill.”283  It is because of these reasons that Feldman believed there was 
so much confusion surrounding what had caused the War of 1812. 
 Feldman continued his accusations against Madison, writing “the key to his success was 
changing the meaning of the war as it was fought, depicting it as a second war of independence 
to establish national sovereignty on the seas.  Reframing the narrative transformed the result into 
a victory.”284  Feldman argued that Madison knew exactly what was at stake, as he “had gambled 
his political legacy on war,” causing the President to “begin his story with impressment,” the 
author charged.285  Despite the many setbacks, Feldman concluded that Madison “triumphed 
despite failing to achieve his original goals.”286  Listing his successes, the author concluded 
“Madison’s presidential legacy was now assured.  He had striven to avoid war, and his economic 
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sanctions proved in retrospect that he had embraced force only when it was unavoidable… and in 
the process, he had cemented the dominance of the Republican Party, which aspired- according 
to Madison’s constitutional vision- to end partisanship altogether.”287 
 Feldman also discussed other possible causes of the war, such as Native American 
relations.  He explained that while “Americans wanted conquest for expansion” they were left 
with “no peaceful means readily available to improve border relations” as the “Indian tribes 
wanted to keep the land on which they lived.”288 The author concluded, as Black recently did, 
that the increasing tensions with Native Americans had more to do with American expansion, 
and less to with nefarious actions by British military officers.289  If anyone was to be blamed for 
increasing tensions, Feldman concluded it would have to be the person who encouraged 
Americans to move westward after purchasing a large among of land.  Feldman, of course, was 
referencing Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase that had been completed several years earlier.290 
 In his text, Feldman also took a moment to address the work of historian Henry Adams in 
his History of the United States of America 1801- 1817.  Feldman wrote that Adams’ 
interpretation was flawed, with the historian interpreting “Madison’s…policies as the adoption of 
the Federalist program associated with his great-grandfather John Adams.”291  Instead, Feldman 
argued that Adams “overstated” the case for his grandfather, reminding his reader that this biased 
piece was what heavily influenced the historiography concerning topics involving the War of 
1812 for decades.292  Feldman concluded that the evidence was clear, Madison had “muddied” 
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the cause of the war of 1812 on purpose, not only to save his career, but also in order to preserve 
the union. 
 In 2015 Richard Maass published his article “Difficult to Relinquish Territory Which 
Had Been Conquered”: Expansionism and the War of 1812.”  In this article, the author revisited 
“expansionism” causes of the war that had been popularized by Julius Pratt in the 1940s.  Maass 
sought to explain how that explanation had gained traction and concluded that historians in that 
camp had likened the events to recent wars.  He wrote “it was not a premeditated land grab akin 
to the 1939 German invasion of Poland.”293  Maass explained “it was not even a war that 
President James Madison wanted to fight.  In fact, both the Madison administration and the 
majority of Congress opposed the annexation of Canada.”294   
In an attempt to explain why Pratt may have been misguided, Maass explained that the 
theory may have been given more merit than it deserved as “visions of acquiring Canadian land 
inflamed public opinion in the northwest territories and hand handful of congressmen.”295 
However, Maass noted that “the majority of US leaders firmly opposed annexation.”296  Maass 
explained that rather than a land grab, the war of 1812 it was a diplomatic bluff of continental 
proportions.”297  Maas argued that clearly, “the war was a desperate act on the part of US leaders 
brought to their wits end by British maritime restrictions, which were themselves desperate acts 
by a British government fighting for its life against Napoleon.”298  Maass wrote that “after six 
years of failed US attempts at commercial coercion, war was seen as the only lever remaining by 
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which the United states might free itself from those maritime restrictions, which had combined 
with the ill-advised US commercial retaliations to devastate the American economy.”299  Again, 
a pattern emerges where historians paint Madison as both the cause of the war, and the nation’s 
only hope. 
Maass then attempted to then explain the other side of the expansionist argument, 
discussing the many ways in which the United States had shown it had no interest in acquiring 
Canada.  Maass explained that while “U.S. leaders wanted Canada during the revolution…by 
1812 the United States had changed. The constitution gave various states a measure of influence 
over each other's domestic affairs through the federal government, heightening tensions among 
conflicting interests.”300 Many feared “the anticipated effect of a territorial acquisition on the 
domestic balance of power,” causing it to become “a key factor in calculating the desirability of 
expansion not only with the annexation of Canada.”301 Specifically, Maass noted that many in 
Congress feared the annexation “would spark a dissolution of the union.”302 The author also 
explained that relatively “few Americans were eager to re assimilate Canada’s British loyalists,” 
as rampant Anglophobia persisted.  Maass also noted the “problems” with assimilating the 
French Canadians as it was “feared” that the “French population’s… Catholicism and 
monarchism might contaminate American society.”303  As far as Maass was concerned, the 
answers as to what caused the war were easily explained when assessing Madison’s actions. 
  
 








When describing the war, historian and (then) soon to President Theodore Roosevelt 
concluded that “the grounds of the war were singularly uncertain.”304  While it has been over a 
century since Roosevelt declared his stance, one must ask if historians have answered the 
seemingly unending question about why exactly the war was fought. 
While it appears that almost every angle has been assessed, most historians tend to be 
agreement that “maritime grievances” was the main drive behind the decision to declare war.  
Native American relations, and the desire to expand the nation may have been extremely 
important issues at the time, but many historians seem to conclude that without the conflicts 
involving free trade and impressment, treaties could have been effective in realizing these other 
goals. 
As the historiography on the topic continues to grow, it appears that those assessing the 
situation in the early twenty first century have decided to target James Madison.  While they 
bring up many interesting points, these historians have proven that while not intentional 
Madison’s actions that resulted in war could have caused the nation to fail shortly after it started.  
However, one important conclusion several have made is that Madison never intended to go to 
war.  In fact, they concluded that he attempted to avoid war in any way he believed possible.  As 
Noah Feldman wrote, “[Madison] had not sought the presidency in fulfillment of the 
psychological drives that have powered so many into the office, for good or for ill.  He had run 
because he believed he could successfully navigate the dangerous shoals of global war.”305  This 
also explains why the history of the war seems so confusing, as Feldman noted, Madison 
believed it had to be in order to preserve the nation.  The War of 1812 had not been declared on a 
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whim; every single option available had been exhausted until Madison felt he could no longer 
take any other action that would force the belligerent European nations to respect American ships 
on the sea. 
When discussing the future of the topic, a quote from historian Clifford Egan comes to 
mind.  He wrote “one truism is that every generation needs to rewrite the past.”306  With attention 
firmly placed on Madison it will be interesting to see where historians in the twenty first century 
will go.  Perhaps with such a solid understanding of what exactly caused the war, historians can 
now answer Reginald Horsman’s call to focus more attention on how the ever-changing 
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